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In January 2012, the United States requested the assistance of the New Zealand 
government under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 (MACMA) to 
execute a search warrant at Kim Dotcom’s residence. A few months later, the High Court 
held that this warrant was invalid and its execution unlawful. The case illustrates the 
importance of effective cooperation between two executive authorities. This article will 
build on the case and argue that the flexibility of MACMA provisions must be used by 
domestic authorities to ensure that a request accords with domestic law and fulfils the 
purpose of the Act. The flexibility of these provisions are even more important to utilise 
under the new landscape of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, enacted after Dotcom v 
Attorney-General, to ensure that New Zealand can register and enforce a foreign search 
warrant request. 
 
[Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, international criminal cooperation, 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012, search warrant.] 
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I   Introduction 
 
Dotcom v Attorney-General
1
 illustrates the difficulty New Zealand, as a requested 
country, faces when registering and giving effect to a foreign search warrant request. The 
United States was able to request this assistance under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Act 1992 (MACMA). MACMA was enacted to show that New Zealand “is 
prepared to play its part in the fight against international crime”.2 The Act provides a 
statutory framework for formal cooperation between the New Zealand government and a 
requesting country.  
 
The question following Dotcom v Attorney-General is New Zealand’s proper role, as a 
requested country, upon receiving a search warrant request. This article argues that New 
Zealand authorities must use the flexibility of the statutory provisions in MACMA to 
ensure that a request can be carried out in accordance with domestic law. At each stage of 
the search warrant process, MACMA provisions can ensure that enforcement action is 
permissible, relevance of things to be seized can be ascertained, and procedures for dealing 
with seized items and forensic copies are consistent with domestic law and the purpose of 
MACMA. This enables authorities to be responsive to developments in crime and 
technology that can lead to legislative gaps.  
 
The article begins by providing an overview of the developments in international 
criminal cooperation and New Zealand’s response in Section II. Section III discusses the 
facts and issues Dotcom v Attorney-General raise concerning the role of the requested 
country. Section IV looks at the search warrant process, and the difficulties New Zealand 
authorities have in ensuring that the request can be given effect, especially facing the new 
legislative landscape under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. Lastly, Section V 
suggests that the imposition of search warrant conditions can overcome the difficulties 
identified in Section IV. These conditions can providing clarity and ensure that the request 
is compatible with domestic law and the purpose of MACMA. 
 
 
 
1    Dotcom v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1494, [2012] 3 NZLR 115. [Dotcom]. 
2    (20 August 1992) 528 NZPD 10827. 
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II   Origins of International Criminal Cooperation 
 
Prior to the 1980s, crime was regarded a local matter and states were not concerned 
with assisting other states in using their enforcement jurisdiction.
3
 Aside from extradition, 
assistance was limited to forms of informal cooperation such as cooperation between 
national police forces through Interpol. Unlike the criminal jurisdiction, cooperation was 
common in civil and commercial matters where measures for the service of process and 
taking of evidence abroad had existed for a long time.
4
 
 
With developments in technology and patterns of organised crime enhancing 
transnational crime, criminals were able to take advantage of the lack of international 
cooperation and move themselves, as well as the instruments and proceeds of crime 
between countries to evade authorities.
5
 Particular crimes causing concern were drug and 
human trafficking, commercial fraud and money laundering.
6
 Crime could no longer be 
regarded a local matter. The law needed to respond to these crimes regarded as injurious to 
the international community as a whole. 
 
A   Response from Commonwealth Countries and United Nations 
 
In response, the Harare Scheme and the United Nations Model Treaty were formulated 
to provide a framework for states to develop the provision of assistance. Although it is not 
possible to directly apply foreign law in foreign countries, the basis of cooperation is that 
existing measures of compulsion in one country should be made available to the 
prosecuting authorities of another country.
7
 A request by a foreign country (requesting 
country) is registered in the requested country and takes effect as if it were a domestic 
 
 
3    Clive Nicholls, Clare Montgomery and Julian B. Knowles The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at [17.04]. 
4    David McClean International Co-Operation in Civil and Criminal Matters (3rd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012, at 27 and 73. 
5    Nicholls, Montgomery and Knowles, above n 3, at [17.01]. 
6    McClean, above n 4, at 154. Terrorism can now be added to the list of particular crimes.   
7    Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth: Explanatory 
Material prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1988) at 
Preface. [“Explanatory Material prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions”]. 
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action. The requested country’s laws govern the execution of the request without 
interference from the requesting country, thereby removing any purported extra-territorial 
effect of the request that had made assistance objectionable in the past. 
 
The Commonwealth Scheme, known as the Harare Scheme, was concluded in 1986.
8
 
Similar requirements from the Commonwealth’s extradition scheme were used, including 
the threshold for a relevant offence to request assistance; dual criminality in the requesting 
and requested country; and a political offences exception to refuse assistance.
9
 The 
Scheme provides a broad platform for a guaranteed level of cooperation Commonwealth-
wide, and one which can be enhanced on a bilateral basis.
10
 A prescribed form of request 
was decided to be incompatible with the diverse fact situations that required assistance, 
allowing requests to adapt to changing circumstances.
11
 The Scheme leaves individual 
governments to decide what measures shall be available to a requesting country.
12
 
 
Following the Harare Scheme, in 1990 the United Nations adopted the text of a model 
treaty to be used as a basis for future negotiations between Member States.
13
 This Model 
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters provides a “useful framework that could 
be of assistance to States interested in negotiating and concluding bilateral agreements 
aimed at improving co-operation in matters of crime prevention”.14 The Harare Scheme 
and Model Treaty are revised periodically to address areas of uncertainty and/or concerns 
of states, as well as to reflect changes in technology and types of assistance.  
 
B   New Zealand’s Response 
 
MACMA was enacted in response to both the Harare Scheme and United Nations 
Model Treaty.
15
 Following from these, it provides assistance in two areas: 
 
 
8    Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth (Harare Scheme). 
9    Note that dual criminality is now a discretionary ground for refusal under s 27(2)(a).  
10   Explanatory Material prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions, above n 7, at Preface. 
11   McClean, above n 4, at 180. 
12   Explanatory Material prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions, above n 7, Introductory paper at [18].   
13   McClean, above n 4, at 185. 
14   Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters GA Res 45/117, A/RES/45/117 (1990). 
15   Solicitor-General v Bujak [2008] NZCA 334, [2009] 1 NZLR 185 at [23]. [Solicitor-General v Bujak]. 
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1. International judicial assistance in locating witnesses, service of process, 
production of evidence, and search and seizure requests.  
2. Tracing, seizure and forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of crime.   
 
All requests are made to or from the Attorney-General, as the designated “Central 
Authority”.16 MACMA allows New Zealand to accept requests from a prescribed foreign 
country or any convention country.
17
 It was recognised during its Bill stage that New 
Zealand could provide assistance to non-Commonwealth countries on a bilateral basis or 
ad hoc basis based on reciprocity.
18
 The United States of America became a prescribed 
foreign country in 1998.
19
 This was how they were able to request New Zealand’s 
assistance in Dotcom.  
 
III   Dotcom v Attorney-General 
 
The raid on internet mogul Kim Dotcom’s mansion on 20 January 2012 culminated in 
multiple legal battles played out in New Zealand courts.
20
 The search warrants were issued 
under ss 43 and 44 of MACMA, propelling this legislation into the spotlight. Litigation 
split into issues with the GCSB illegal spying, and an extradition case with the latest 
Supreme Court hearing on July 2013 regarding the disclosure of evidence.
21
 Litigation 
under MACMA has focused on the lawfulness of the search warrant and execution, and 
custody and procedures for the seized items.
22
 
 
 
16   MACMA, s 2(1). “Means the person or authority for the time being designated by that country for the 
purposes of transmitting or receiving requests made under or pursuant to this Act”. 
17   Ibid. Prescribed foreign country means any country that is declared by regulations to be a foreign country 
to which Part 3 of MACMA applies. Current prescribed countries are Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Niue, 
China, The Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  
A convention country means any foreign country that is a party to a convention referred to in column 1 of 
the table in Schedule 1. 
18   (20 August 1992) 528 NZPD 10826. Now contained in MACMA, s 25(A)(2).  
19   Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Prescribed Foreign Country) (United States of America) 
Regulations 1998, reg 1. 
20   There have been 16 reported cases to date.  
21   David Fisher “Dotcom lawyers argue to see evidence” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 30 
July 2013). At the time of writing this article the Supreme Court has yet to issue a judgment regarding 
disclosure of evidence. The extradition hearing is expected now to occur in April 2014.  
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A   Facts 
 
The United States, on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), requested the 
search and seizure of items at Dotcom’s property in conjunction with the Megaupload 
companies.
23
 Dotcom was being investigated by the FBI for breach of criminal copyright, 
conspiracy to breach criminal copyright, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and 
conspiracy to commit racketeering.
24
 The Megaupload websites and associated companies 
administered by Dotcom were said to be used by third parties to reproduce and distribute 
copyrighted material such as motion pictures, and to conduct monetary transactions with 
the proceeds of these unlawful activities.
25
 
 
The North Shore District Court granted the search warrant on 19 January 2012. To 
preserve its evidential integrity, Police protocol dictated the removal of computer hard 
drives offsite for forensic examination.
26
 Around 150 terabytes of data were removed in 
executing the search warrant.
27
 However, these items were not checked for relevance to the 
offence. Forensic copies (referring to the replication of computer data) were made of some 
computer hard drives. All of the seized items were to be kept under the custody of the 
Commissioner of Police pursuant to the Attorney-General’s direction on 16 February 2012 
under s 49(3) of MACMA. However, some of the forensic copies were sent to the FBI 
after this direction. 
Procedures for dealing with the seized items were not addressed in the memorandum 
filed in support of the application by the police.
28
 The key problem was that the police had 
and have had no request from the United States to sort through the broad category of items 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
22   Assets were restrained under s 60 of MACMA. The arrest and extradition of Dotcom was also requested, 
a separate issue not covered under MACMA. A “remedies hearing” for public law damages has been 
postponed for procedural reasons after Winkelmann J said Police conduct could amount to unreasonable 
search and seizure under s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
23   There are four named plaintiffs, the three others are associates of Dotcom‟s; Finn Bato, Mathias Ortman 
and Bram Van der Kolk. For brevity they will be referred to as Dotcom. Assets of all four plaintiffs were 
seized. A second warrant was also executed at Van Der Kolk‟s property.  
24   Dotcom, above n 1, at [10]. 
25   At [11].  
26   At [21]. 
27   At [25]. 
28   At [16]. 
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seized for relevance. The question New Zealand authorities should have asked was 
whether the FBI could have full custody and control over the items to carry out this task 
themselves. 
 
B   Issues and Decision of the Court 
 
Winkelmann J addressed three main issues in the High Court on 28 June 2012. The 
subsequent judgment on 31 May 2013 added further processes to the earlier orders, but 
largely repeated the earlier decision. The issues discussed below provide the basis for 
discussion in Section V and VI.   
 
1   Was the search warrant invalid? 
 
The offences were not adequately described in the warrant making them general 
warrants. The warrant listed the offences as “breach of copy right and money laundering” 
without stating what country’s laws these offences contravened.29 Copyright can exist in 
many things and may be breached in many ways, no description was provided about what 
the offences were in relation to.
30
  
 
The consequence of this was that warrants authorised the search and seizure of a wide 
variety and amount of items. Appendix A listed items such as:
 31
 
 
…all digital devices, including electronic devices capable of storing and/or processing 
data in digital form, including, but not limited to…central processing units…desktop, 
laptop, or notebook computers….mobile telephones. 
 
The inevitability of capturing irrelevant material was compounded by the execution of 
the search warrant at Dotcom’s personal residence. Winkelmann J held that the issuing 
judge could not have been satisfied there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that all 
 
 
29   At [18] and [40]. 
30   At [41] and [46]. 
31   At [19]. 
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of the things listed in Appendix A were evidence of breach of copyright or money 
laundering.
32
  
 
2   Did the Police execution exceed the scope of the search warrant? 
 
Winkelmann J went on to consider that even if the warrants were valid, police 
execution exceeded lawful authority as irrelevant material continued to be held 
unlawfully.
33
 The warrant application did not provide information on when, where or by 
whom the sorting exercise was to take place.
34
 The police argued it was for the FBI to 
undertake this exercise in the interests of cost and time because the New Zealand police 
lacked specialist equipment.   
 
The judge held that the items could be removed offsite if the police reasonably believed 
they contained material of evidential value. However, “issues of relevance must be 
determined at the time of the search and offsite sorting process”.35 Retention of computer 
hard drives could be justified because they were devices on which the offences had been 
committed, but not the irrelevant digital information on it.
36
 
 
3   Was the sending of forensic copies to the FBI unlawful? 
 
The Attorney-General gave a direction on 16 February 2012 under s 49(2) that seized 
items were to remain in the custody and control of the Commissioner of Police. However, 
some forensic copies of hard drives were shipped to the FBI contrary to this. This was held 
to be in breach of s 43(3), and the court ordered the voluntary return of these copies from 
the FBI. 
 
4   Court Orders 
 
 
 
32   At [56]. 
33   At [88]. 
34   At [88]. 
35   At [76]. 
36   At [62]. 
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Procedures for the seized items were addressed in the second judgment. Items 
containing wholly irrelevant material were to be returned to Dotcom. Two different clones 
were to be created for items identified as mixed content devices (those containing both 
relevant and irrelevant material). One “complete” clone provided to Dotcom, and one 
“disclosable” clone with any personal photographs or film deleted to the United States.37 A 
copy was also ordered to be provided to Dotcom, prior to its sending offshore, where the 
item contains only relevant material. Winkelmann J held this process should be done at the 
expense of the police. 
 
Though Dotcom can be treated as an exceptional case, due to its large-scale nature, 
important lessons can be learned for registering and enforcing future search warrants, 
given the increasing number of MACMA requests received by New Zealand.
38
 
 
IV    Search Warrant Process 
 
A search warrant is judicial authority, granted ex parte, allowing for a substantial 
invasion of the privacy and property rights of the individual concerned.
39
 The Search and 
Surveillance Act aims to modernise existing statutes for search, seizure and surveillance. It 
now governs domestic search warrants and parts of a foreign request, changing the 
landscape for future MACMA requests as the Act has taken effect following Dotcom. The 
interaction between these two statutes leaves some areas of a request uncertain under 
domestic law. Furthermore, there are also uncertainties caused by the nature of a foreign 
request. The lack of operational knowledge can result in difficulties for domestic 
authorities to determine the required level of specificity for the warrant and ensuring its 
execution is in line with domestic law.  
 
 
 
 
37   Dotcom v Attorney-General [2013] NZHC 1269 at [65]. [Second Dotcom judgment]. 
38   Statistics from Crown Law Office and Report of the Informal Expert Working Group on Mutual Legal 
Assistance Casework Best Practice (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna) 3-7 December 
2001. In 2012, 42 requests were received by New Zealand; in 2011 38 received; in 2010 44 received; in 
2009 31 requests received; in 2008 20 received; and in 2007 17 received. 
39   Law Commission Search and Surveillance Powers (NZLC R97, 2007) at [2.11] and [4.71]. [Search and 
Surveillance Powers]. 
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A   Overview of the Role of the Requesting and Requested Country 
 
A request is initially an exercise between two executive authorities with minimal 
judicial interference. The requesting country sets out its grounds for why it believes the 
thing is in New Zealand and why it is relevant to the investigation or court proceeding 
(criminal matter).
40
 The basis of the request cannot be challenged in the requested 
country.
41
 Probable time constraints mean that the more detailed the provision of 
information from the requesting country, the faster the request can be undertaken.  
 
Dotcom has shown that although the requesting country is primarily responsible for 
ensuring the request can be undertaken, the onus is ultimately on the requested country to 
ensure that the request can be carried out in accordance with its domestic law. The 
requested country must be sure that the request asks for permissible enforcement action as 
the consequences of unlawful domestic action results in slowing down the 
investigation/proceeding in the requesting country. 
 
B   Permissible Enforcement Action: The Attorney-General’s Role in Receiving a Request 
 
The Attorney-General plays an important role as the designated Central Authority under 
MACMA.
42
 The Attorney-General must balance two objectives: respecting the wishes of 
the requesting country in the interests of cooperation whilst not granting more than 
permissible under domestic law. In A (A Firm of Solicitors) v Auckland District Court, 
Wild J said the “Attorney-General’s role can be viewed as a screening or checking 
process”.43 The case held that the New Zealand Detective in charge of requesting a search 
 
 
40   Crown Law Office “Assistance for Foreign Authorities: Central Authorities”  
<www.crownlaw.govt.nz/pagepub/docs/afa/centralauthorities.asp#7> 
41   Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2) [2004] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 WLR 
2241. Unless the individual has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of justice in the requesting 
country.   
42   Crown Law Office, above n 40. In practice, “the Attorney-General‟s powers under MACMA are largely 
delegated to the Solicitor-General, who is an appointed Law Officer. Lawyers at Crown Law Office, the 
Office of the Solicitor-General, therefore undertake the legal work required to make or fulfil mutual 
assistance requests”. 
43   A (A Firm of Solicitors) v District Court at Auckland [2012] NZCA 246, [2012] 2 NZLR 844 at [42]. 
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warrant was entitled to place reliance on the Attorney-General’s authorisation of the 
application.
44
  
 
1   Right of Refusal 
The Attorney-General carries the power to refuse a request. Mandatory grounds of 
refusal are contained in MACMA s 27(1) and discretionary grounds in s 27(2).  
 
27 Refusal of assistance 
(1) A request by a foreign country for assistance under this Part shall be refused if, in the 
opinion of the Attorney-General,-  
(h) the request is for assistance of a kind that cannot be given under this Act, or would 
require steps to be taken for its implementation that could not lawfully be taken.  
 
S 27(1)(h) is an important provision and is based on the Harare Scheme to ensure that 
the requested country is not required to do more that it would do in a purely domestic 
case.
45
 For example, if the taking of body samples is not provided for under the relevant 
law of the requested country it can refuse the request.
46
 
 
(a)   Removing unlawful steps 
 
The second part of s 27(1)(h) raises an important issue about a request containing 
unlawful steps for implementation in the requested country. These steps may arise during 
the course of cooperation, before or after the request has been made, where the requesting 
country asks or changes its requested enforcement action. Although it is a mandatory 
ground of refusal, s 27(1) gives latitude to the opinion of the Attorney-General. To refuse a 
request where cooperation could remove the unlawful step would contravene the purpose 
of the legislation to provide assistance where possible. S 27(1)(h) should be a last resort 
where reading down the request in line with domestic law is not possible.   
 
 
 
44   Ibid. 
45   McClean, above n 4, at 182. 
46   Explanatory Material prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions, above n 7, Commentary at 27. The 
availability of these procedures under other domestic legislation is immaterial.  
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In Bujak v Solicitor-General, Poland requested New Zealand register and enforce a 
foreign restraining order (FRO) against a Polish resident in New Zealand.
47
 The FRO 
purported to do more than restrain the property of Mr Bujak, it purported to “seize” assets 
in some plain language used in the request, which would be impermissible under domestic 
law.
48
 A FRO is meant to freeze assets pending a court determination to forfeit/confiscate 
these assets.
49
 The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court held that this was not the intention 
of the request, as the Polish Order as a whole was directed to restraint rather than seizure.
50
 
The Court of Appeal held that even if the Polish Order was to go further than restraining 
Mr Bujak’s property, it nonetheless may be registered and have effect within the narrower 
scope permissible under New Zealand law.
51
 S 57(3) of MACMA stated that when an 
order is registered it takes effect as if it were a restraining order made under the Proceeds 
of Crimes Act 1991.
52
 Therefore, any purportedly wider operation of the foreign order than 
is permissible under domestic law is stripped away.  
 
This article would add one qualifier to the Court of Appeal’s decision. If a request is 
wider than permissible under domestic law, this should be brought to the attention of the 
requesting country as soon as possible.
53
 Removing the unlawful step should not be done 
unilaterally by the requested country as this would undermine the purpose of cooperation 
and the intention of the requesting country. Although this may be a barrier to expediency, 
better cooperation can result in a request where both authorities are clear on its execution. 
 
For example, in the A (A Firm of Solicitors) case, the Attorney-General questioned part 
of the request to search A’s personal residence. The other part of the request was to search 
A’s business). There were emails between the two authorities, and the court drew the 
inference that the Attorney-General queried the propriety of or necessity for the search at 
A’s personal residence.54 As a result, the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office withdrew 
 
 
47   Bujak v Solicitor-General [2009] NZSC 42, [2009] 3 NZLR 179 at [4]. [Bujak v Solicitor-General]. 
48   At [6].  
49   At [12]. 
50   At [21] and [23]. 
51   Solicitor-General v Bujak, above n 15, at [27] and [41]. 
52   At [27]. Now replaced by the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. 
53   See also the Harare Scheme, art 7(3).  
 
 
15 
 
this part of the request, rather than the New Zealand authorities omitting this part of the 
search from the warrant application.  
 
(b)  How would this have applied to Dotcom? 
 
It was clear in Bujak that the intention of the Polish authorities was never to do 
anything more than restrain property. In Dotcom the FBI wanted all the material seized to 
ascertain relevance themselves; an impermissible step under New Zealand law. To narrow 
the scope of the request would not have been possible without cooperation and would go 
against the intention of the requesting country. If cooperation could not remove the 
unlawful step, the Attorney-General should have refused the request. The Attorney-
General plays an important role at first instance, and can interpret s 27(1)(h) in light of the 
broader purpose of MACMA to facilitate cooperation, where possible, towards domestic 
compliance. 
 
C    Registering the Request 
 
If the request is approved under s 43 of MACMA, the Attorney-General can authorise a 
constable to apply to an issuing officer (judge) for a search warrant under s 44. If the 
application is made consistently with the provisions of subpart 3 of Part 4 of the Search 
and Surveillance Act, the judge may grant the warrant.  
 
44 Search warrants 
(1) An issuing officer who, on an application made in the manner provided in subpart 3 of Part 
4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that there is in or on any place or thing— 
(a) any thing upon or in respect of which any offence under the law of a foreign 
country punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2 years or more has been, or is 
suspected of having been, committed; or 
(b) any thing which there are reasonable grounds for believing will be evidence as to 
the commission of any such offence; or 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
54   A (A Firm of Solicitors) v District Court at Auckland, above n 43, at [13]. 
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(c) any thing which there are reasonable grounds for believing is intended to be used 
for the purpose of committing any such offence— 
may issue a search warrant in respect of that thing. 
(2) An application for a warrant under subsection (1) may be made only by a constable 
authorised under section 43(2). 
(3) The provisions of Part 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (except subpart 6) apply. 
 
S 44 is an important provision as it sets out the relationship between MACMA and the 
Search and Surveillance Act. The constable and judge are responsible for implementing 
the request in accordance with domestic law. The court is not simply a rubber stamp and 
also plays an important role to check the request is in accordance with domestic law.
55
 As 
a judge “may” issue a warrant, s 44(1) implies that he or she can refuse/modify a search 
warrant application. In line with the spirit of MACMA the judge must try give effect to a 
request over refusing to register it. An illustration of the discretionary power an issuing 
officer has is in Solicitor-General v Beneficial Owners of Various Bank Accounts. Ronald 
Young J sent the FRO request back to the New South Wales (NSW) authorities, as once 
registered it would entitle the Public Trustee of NSW to effectively uplift funds from the 
New Zealand bank accounts and transfer them to Australia. Ronald Young J said “this 
power seemed to me to be more than a restraining order with respect to the funds”.56 New 
Zealand then obtained an amended order from the NSW authorities addressing this 
mischief. Issuing officers should be alert to these possibilities, as analogous to the 
Attorney-General, they too can remove unlawful steps to ensure the request accords with 
domestic law. 
 
1   Importance of specificity 
 
The level of specificity required in each search warrant is fact-specific. Specificity is an 
important protection for the individual against the improper use of an intrusive state 
power.
57
 New Zealand authorities have tended to replicate information provided by the 
 
 
55   JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association v Director of the Serious Fraud Department [2012] EWHC 
1674 (Admin) at [53]. 
56   Solicitor-General v Beneficial Owners of Various Bank Accounts CIV-2008-485-1070, 21 May 2008 at 
[2]. 
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requesting country when registering the request.
58
 Although this is consistent with mutual 
reliance, it can cause problems where the required level of specificity is not met.  
 
S 103(4)(g) of the Search and Surveillance Act states that the warrant must have a 
“description of what may be seized”. To overcome the difficulty that electronic material 
posed in Dotcom, the warrant should state that all computer hard drives the offence is 
believed to have been committed on will be searched for relevant material. There may be 
cases where the wide ranging nature of the offence makes it difficult to frame the 
application for a warrant in very specific terms.
59
 Factors such as the stage of the criminal 
matter should also be considered, as a wider category of items may be requested at an early 
investigative stage. Likely time constraints and the breadth of supporting documents for 
the warrant can also leave room for error. The issuing officer has the final authorisation to 
decide what is possible to specify in the particular circumstances.
60
 This role is largely 
identical to considerations for purely domestic requests. The judge must not be afraid to 
request further information from the requesting country even if it risks slowing down the 
process.  
 
D   Ascertaining Relevancy during Execution 
 
The police must ensure that in executing the warrant they exercise powers in 
accordance to the Search and Surveillance Act and s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 which protects an individual against unreasonable search and seizure. A search 
warrant cannot authorise seizure of irrelevant material.
61
 If evidence is obtained unlawfully 
in New Zealand, the individual can challenge its admissibility in the requesting country in 
accordance with an equivalent s 36 MACMA provision.  
 
There must to be a link between the item seized and the criminal matter, and this must 
be considered again at execution. The detail of this link, alike to specificity, is fact-based. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
57   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, [4.135]-[4.136].  
58   Dotcom, above n 1, at [16]; A v District Court at Auckland CIV-2011-404-4796 22 December 2011 at 
[24]. [A v District Court at Auckland].  
59   A v District Court at Auckland, above n 58, at [95]. 
60   Ibid. 
61   Dotcom, above n 1, at [77]. 
18 
 
Executing a search warrant still requires that items be checked for relevance to the offence, 
even if they are specified clearly in the warrant. Relevancy can be determined on site or 
offsite.
62
 This safeguard is to prevent what is known in the civil jurisdiction as a “fishing 
expedition” and ensure that irrelevant material is protected.63 Ascertaining relevance 
requires knowledge of the criminal matter and may be the most time intensive part of the 
process, especially if there is a broad category of items to be searched. 
 
The requested country must be clear on how and by whom relevance can be 
ascertained. It presumes a high level of information and cooperation between the 
authorities about the scope of items to be searched and seized. The difficulty of this 
process was exacerbated in Dotcom due to the scale of items to be searched. However, in a 
previous case of A (A Firm of Solicitors) the items were of a narrower scope and detailed 
information was provided about the investigation. Operational knowledge will always be a 
barrier and cooperation is vital for relevance to be determined. Section V will look at ways 
in which this process can be better managed.  
 
E   Procedures for Seized Items 
 
The procedures to deal with seized items under domestic law are set out in Part 4, 
subpart 6 of the Search and Surveillance Act. However, this provision is excluded under 
MACMA s 44(3). If a computer hard drive only constitutes a thing seized under the Search 
and Surveillance Act, the question is what procedures apply to the electronic material 
under MACMA.   
 
1   Why is subpart 6 excluded from MACMA? 
 
The reason behind the amendment to s 44(3) of MACMA on 1 October 2012 is not on 
public record.
64
 It was inserted in s 335, Part 5 of the Search and Surveillance Act enacted 
 
 
62   Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 112 legitimises the offsite sorting process by allowing items of 
uncertain status to be removed from the site to determine whether it may lawfully be seized. 
63   Lord Collins et al (eds) Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2012) at 8-103. 
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to amend and repeal other domestic legislation. This article puts forward two reasons for 
this amendment.  
 
Firstly, the exclusion assumes cooperation between the authorities as to whether the 
items seized are to be sent to the requesting country. The procedures in the Search and 
Surveillance Act contemplate local trial and use of the seized materials under domestic 
law. Under MACMA seized items are likely to be sent overseas, and the requesting 
country gains custody of them.
65
  
 
Secondly, under s 49(2) the decision for the sending of seized material lies with the 
Attorney-General which provides that- 
 
49(2) 
Where a thing is delivered into the custody of the Commissioner of Police under 
subsection (1), the Commissioner of Police shall arrange for the thing to be kept for a 
period not exceeding 1 month from the day on which the thing was seized pending a 
direction in writing from the Attorney-General as to the manner in which the thing is to be 
dealt with (which may include a direction that the thing be sent to an appropriate authority 
of a foreign country). 
 
If no direction is given by the Attorney-General before the end of one month, under s 
49(4) the Commissioner of Police has to return the things to the individual as soon as 
practicable. S 156 of the Search and Surveillance Act that manages the application for 
release/access to things seized does not apply (as it is in subpart 6) because by then 
Attorney-General has at its power the ability to deal with that material. There are no 
equivalent provisions in MACMA.  
The procedures governing seized items are all left to the direction of the Attorney-
General. The main concern is that this emphasis on cooperation creates too much 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
64   Ministry of Justice official correspondence stated “the rules in subpart 6 of Part 4 of the Search and 
Surveillance Act are not applicable to MACMA because the specific provisions in MACMA are required 
to allow that regime to work”. Searches of Parliamentary Debates, Select Committee Reports did not 
provide any further information.  
65   In MACMA, there is no provision that once these items are no longer needed they are to be returned to 
the requested country. But see the Harare Scheme art 23(2) and UN Model Treaty.  
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flexibility leading to uncertainty for the executing authorities and individual. As items 
remain in police custody, police must ensure they follow the s 49 direction. The requested 
country must always be alert to this possibility of sending material overseas and have 
processes in place to ensure that when items are sent, the s 49 direction is followed and 
any conditions imposed on the seized items.  
 
F   Forensic Copies and Mixed Content Devices 
 
1   Position under domestic law 
 
Under s 3 of the Search and Surveillance Act a forensic copy of a computer hard drive 
does not constitute “things seized”. Rather it is the hard drive that constitutes a “thing” to 
be searched and seized. Under this interpretation section of the Act, a seized item does not 
include anything made or generated by a person exercising a search and surveillance 
power. This would also be likely to apply to copies of tangible documents. These copies 
are therefore not subject to the notice and inventory requirements of s 133, as well as the 
procedural requirements in subpart 6 above.
66
  
 
Taking a forensic copy may be necessary for two reasons:
67
 
1. To apply forensic investigative techniques in order to identify the evidential 
material, which it is generally not practicable to do onsite. 
2. To preserve the evidential integrity of the material, which would otherwise be 
contaminated by the copying of fragments of data from the hard drive.  
 
There is one provision in s 161 (in subpart 6) that gives specific direction as to the 
disposal of forensic copies. A forensic copy that contains only non-evidential material has 
to be destroyed under s 161(1). S 161(2) is the most useful provision whereby if the copy 
contains a mixture of data that is evidential and non-evidential, the forensic copy “can” be 
retained in its entirety and continue to be searched.  
 
 
 
66   Warren Young, Neville Trendle and Richard Mahoney Search and Surveillance Act and Analysis 
(Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at [SS3.46.01]. 
67   At [SS110.13]. 
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The Law Commission recommended this be enacted for practical reasons to preserve 
the evidential integrity of the copy and save time that is likely to be needed to separate out 
irrelevant material.
68
 A public policy argument favoured weighing the expediency of 
retaining the whole copy for the purposes of prevention and detection of crime over the 
privacy rights of the individual. 
 
2   Position under MACMA 
 
(a)   Are forensic copies subject to the Attorney-General’s direction?  
 
Winkelmann J in Dotcom recognised that the wording of s 49 does not address how 
copies fit within the regime.
69
 However, held that this did not need to be addressed because 
the Attorney-General did give a direction that any items seized were to remain in the 
custody and control of the Commissioner of Police.
70
 “Custody” was given a broad 
meaning to include forensic copies as they were under the control of the police; therefore 
sending the forensic copies was found unlawful.
71
 This would have been a correct 
interpretation of s 49 given that the Search and Surveillance Act was not enacted until after 
the dispute in Dotcom. 
 
The position now would be that forensic copies are not subject to the Attorney-
General‟s direction because s 49 refers to “things seized”. This can create undesirable 
consequences for the individual‟s privacy rights as copies can be sent without any 
direction from the Attorney-General, and also creates uncertainties for the police on how 
to handle copies made. This would undermine the purpose of s 49 to ensure all items 
relevant to the criminal matter remain under the Attorney-General‟s control.  Leaving a 
position where the wording and purpose of MACMA conflicts with the Search and 
Surveillance Act, illustrating the difficulty caused by domestic law only contemplating 
police custody of items. Winkelmann J‟s approach to give “custody” a wide meaning to 
include all items under police control can ensure that forensic copies remain under the 
 
 
68   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [13.72]. 
69   Dotcom, above n 1, at [94]. 
70   At [95]. 
71   At [94]. 
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Attorney-General‟s direction, alternatively this can be imposed as a search warrant 
condition.  
 
(b) What about mixed content devices? 
 
The position of a „mixed content device‟ is open under MACMA as to whether a 
forensic copy be retained in its entirety or whether irrelevant material has to be deleted. 
The pre-Search and Surveillance Act position was that the police did not have a right to 
retain the irrelevant material on mixed content devices.
72
 The current position still reflects 
this in part, as s 161 states it “can” be retained in its entirety.  
 
In the second judgment, Winkelmann J used s 161 of the Search and Surveillance Act 
to inform her decision. The orders made show the intention that irrelevant material still has 
to be protected where possible. Irrelevant material ordered to be deleted was limited to 
personal photographs and film, recognising that further technical directions to give effect 
to this may be required.
73
 Winkelmann J acknowledged that it was unknown how difficult 
the process for the sorting would be.
74
 Preference should be given to the wishes of the 
requesting country, however, it is for the requested country to ultimately decide how best 
to give effect to the request. New Zealand authorities must weigh the rights involved and 
decide whether retaining the entirety of the copy is necessary, and whether irrelevant 
material can be deleted without impeding expediency.  
 
A concern in the judgment was that once copies were sent overseas, the police had little 
control over them to “compel their return, nor prevent the FBI dealing with them as it 
chose”.75 However, evidence obtained can only be used for the specific purpose it was 
given, this is contained in MACMA for New Zealand authorities using material obtained 
abroad, and there will be comparable legislation in the requesting country to protect the 
rights of the individual.
76
  
 
 
72   Second Dotcom judgment, above n 37, at [59]; Search and Surveillance Act and Analysis at [SS110.13]. 
73   Ibid, second Dotcom judgment, at [59].  
74   Ibid. 
75   Dotcom, above n 1, at [96]. 
76   MACMA, s 23.  
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(c) Legislative action? 
 
Legislative amendment for MACMA is necessary to clarify the position. These are 
likely to be important issues as forensic copying allows for a faster process and for data to 
be examined later.
77
 It is encouraged where the original device is not required, and in the 
current technological era more information is likely to be contained on computer hard 
drives rather than hard copy documents. If it is not clear for New Zealand authorities how 
to deal with forensic copies under MACMA, it will also be difficult for the requesting 
country to frame a valid and specific request. If the police can retain mixed content devices 
in their entirety under a domestic warrant, they need to know how to deal with them under 
a MACMA request.  
 
Inserting a provision in s 49, similar to that of s 161, would bring MACMA into line 
with domestic law and ensure that mixed content devices do not slip into a legislative gap.  
It might only be clear after execution the extent of irrelevant material, s 161 recognises 
that expediency for authorities may be more important. In practice, however, courts have 
favoured separation of irrelevant material. Cooperation should recognise a compromise 
that reflects the scope of the request and mitigates against erosion of the rights of the 
individual where possible. In the interim, as will be discussed in the next Section, the 
Attorney-General can impose conditions to subject forensic copies to its custody and 
control.  
 
V   Imposition of Search Warrant Conditions 
 
The most important tool the requested country has to achieve domestic compliance is 
imposing conditions on the search warrant. The imposition of conditions can take account 
of any factors that would be likely to exacerbate the intrusiveness of the execution of a 
warrant and ensure that the search and seizure is in conformity with domestic law 
requirements.
78
 The main danger with this approach is that imports too much flexibility 
and uncertainty into the process. However, requiring mandatory conditions constrain the 
 
 
77   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [7.36]. 
78   At [4.145].  
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fact-specific nature of requests. The major advantage of imposing conditions is that it can 
cope with developments in crime and technology, rather than requiring legislative change. 
 
Under s 29 of MACMA, the Attorney-General has the power to impose any conditions 
it thinks fit. This is also consistent with s 5 of MACMA which allows new forms of formal 
and informal cooperation to develop. Similar provisions for the imposition of conditions 
are contained in the equivalent Australian and Canadian legislation, as well as the United 
Nations Model Treaty and Harare Scheme.
79
  
 
Winkelmann J explores this option of imposing conditions under s 45(3) of MACMA. 
Although this provision has been repealed since Dotcom, the same provision is now 
contained in s 103(3)(b) of the Search and Surveillance Act for the constable and issuing 
judge.  S 103(3)(b) envisaged imposing conditions such as the time of execution and 
writing a search warrant report, however this does not mean it cannot be used for this 
purpose under MACMA.
80
 These conditions will be contained on the search warrant 
document for the individual and executing authorities to know the parameters of the 
execution. 
 
A   Joint Investigative Teams 
 
Winkelmann J in Dotcom highlighted the difficulty for the police in ascertaining 
relevancy of the seized items as they did not have the same level of knowledge as the 
requesting country‟s authorities. Joint investigative teams can be used to overcome this 
operational information barrier and ensure a more expeditious process. MACMA is open 
to new developments to enhance cooperation. It is permissible under both ss 5 and 29 for 
joint investigation teams to develop as a form of cooperation and as a condition to be 
imposed on the execution of the request.  
 
 
 
79   Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth); Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
RSC 1985 c 30; United Nations Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1990, art 4(4); 
Harare Scheme, art 23(1)(b) and art 32.  
80   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [4.143].  
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Imposition of this condition depends on the context. Winkelmann J was adamant that 
the FBI should have helped with the execution of request and subsequent sorting:
 81
 
 
To enable the MACMA regime to achieve its purposes, it seems inevitable that in complex 
cases the investigating authorities must be engaged in the sorting exercise, which proper 
execution of the warrant requires.  
 
This can overcome the problems for how and who is to do the sorting process, as 
identified earlier. Canadian courts have been sceptical about extent of the involvement of 
requesting country‟s authorities in execution of the request; viewing it as susceptible to 
„capture‟ by the requesting country.82 Article 13 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union sets out a 
framework for the composition and operation of these teams to ensure that this concern 
does not eventuate.
83
 Furthermore, the restriction on the use of evidence provides an 
important safeguard for the individual and it can prevent foreign officers from using 
information obtained for any other purpose other than the specific offence. 
 
Joint investigative teams are easier to set up and manage in the European Union 
because of political, economic and physical connectedness. A joint investigative team was 
used in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others Ex Parte Fininvest 
S.p.A and Others, where the Italian authorities accompanied the British in executing the 
search warrant request in England, mainly because the documents were in Italian.
84
 They 
will not always be necessary, as detailed sharing of information and cooperation (both 
formal and informal communication) can be sufficient for the requested countries to carry 
out the sorting process themselves. The Mutual Legal Assistance guidelines in the United 
Kingdom allow a requesting country to justify why their personnel should accompany the 
 
 
81   Dotcom, above n 1, at [85]. 
82  Germany (Federal Republic) v Ebke 2001 NWTSC 52, (2001) 158 CCC (3d) 253 (NWTSC) at [90]; 
Robert J. Currie “Search Warrants Under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act” (2003) 
12 C.R. (6th) at 275 at 280-281. It is viewed as defeating the purpose of the „sending hearing‟ where the 
court determines whether foreign officials should have access to evidence seized.  
83   Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union [2000] OJ C 197/01), art 13. 
84   R v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others Ex Parte Fininvest S.p.A and Others [1997] 
1 WLR 743 (Div Ct).  
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execution of the search warrant.
 85 
New Zealand too should be open to this, and identify it 
as a tool to be used for expediency.  
 
B   Offsite Sorting for Electronic Material 
 
In Dotcom, the police did some sorting onsite, but evidence was that they had only 
limited information available to them to assist with this task.
86
 Winkelmann J held that 
even if the warrant was specific as to offence and items to be seized:
 87
  
 
…It may have been appropriate to impose conditions because those conditions could have 
addressed just how the offsite sorting exercise was to be undertaken. In considering 
whether to impose conditions it was relevant for the Judge in this case to weigh the 
inevitability of an offsite sorting exercise, the likely size of that exercise, and the 
requirements for cloning the content of the digital storage devices.  
 
In searching a person‟s computer the concern is that a large amount of information of 
many different types, unrelated to the basis for the search, is potentially accessible.
88
 
Seized items should be ascertained for relevance in the requested country so that they 
remain subject to the direction and jurisdiction of the requested country‟s courts. Once sent 
overseas, the requested country relies on the voluntary return of materials.  
 
Conditions should address the factors such as whether an original or copy of the hard 
drive is required, and where and when it will take place. This will depend on the type and 
amount of items to be searched. Both of these methods will require making a forensic copy 
of the computer hard drive. Even though in Dotcom the police said that forensic copies 
would not suffice because the originals contain encrypted data, Winkelmann J ordered that 
all of these hard drives be copied any way.
89
 This demonstrates the inclination to make 
 
 
85   United Kingdom Home Office Requests for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters: Guidelines for 
authorities outside of the United Kingdom (10th ed, London, 2012) at 32. 
86   Second Dotcom judgment, above n 37, footnote 22.  
87   Dotcom, above n 1, at [81]. 
88   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [7.14].  
89   Second Dotcom judgment, above n 37, at [55] and footnote 23.   
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forensic copies where possible, and although in subpart 6, it is also contained in s 152 of 
the Search and Surveillance Act.  
 
1   Would the appointment of an independent supervising solicitor help in the execution 
and sorting exercise? 
 
Following the failure of domestic authorities to form a process to ascertain relevance, 
Winkelmann J in Dotcom set out a process, as a form of discretionary relief, for an 
independent barrister/solicitor to conduct a review of all of the items seized for relevancy. 
The second judgment ordered the process to be completed at police expense.   
 
Appointing an independent practitioner is similar to the process for a search order in the 
civil jurisdiction (previously known as an Anton Piller order) used to secure or preserve 
evidence. An independent practitioner accompanies the party carrying out the search to 
supervise its execution as such searches are between private parties, and whatever else the 
court thinks fit under the order.
90
 A search order is different to a search warrant because it 
is dependent on the defendant‟s consent, whereas a search warrant is a key law 
enforcement role.
91
  
 
The key argument for an independent practitioner is to safeguard the rights of the 
defendant and ensure the process is fair.
92
 The main challenge under MACMA is ensuring 
that the requested country knows how to ascertain relevance. An independent practitioner 
is unlikely to be able to help with this, as effective cooperation is the solution to the 
operational knowledge barrier. To allow an independent practitioner to take on this role 
would substitute a key aspect of a law enforcement role. There is no requirement for 
independent supervision under domestic law, and it could slow down the process and 
increase costs.  
 
A different argument could be made if there are privilege issues involved. In the United 
Kingdom, the courts have encouraged officers to involve independent counsel in domestic 
 
 
90   High Court Rules, r 33.7.  
91   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [12.82]. 
92   John Katz Search Orders, (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at [6.1]. 
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searches to review claims of privilege on the premises.
93
 The Law Commission only 
considered the appointment of an independent practitioner for searches of confidential 
client material held at lawyer‟s premises, and decided it should be considered on a case-
by-case basis as a warrant condition.
94
  
 
Existing measures can adequately safeguard the individual as police are presumed to act 
in accordance with domestic law, and their actions can be challenged in a judicial review 
proceeding by the individual. Under the Search and Surveillance Act enforcement officers 
are also able to take photographs, record images and sound to protect themselves from 
allegations of impropriety in accessing the place to be searched or in undertaking the 
search.
95
 
 
C   Retention of Mixed Content Devices 
 
As outlined earlier, s 161 of the Search and Surveillance Act does not apply to 
MACMA. Forensic copies can be dealt with entirely at the option of New Zealand 
authorities. The main concern is the irrelevant material on these copies and whether it is to 
be deleted. This exercise may appear to be retrospective, as it is likely that the extent of 
this will only be uncovered once forensic copies are searched. If there is a substantial 
amount of material, the use of joint investigative teams could ensure an expedient process 
to delete irrelevant material.  
 
S 29 of MACMA can be used to ensure that forensic copies remain subject to the 
direction of the Attorney-General, and that they remain in police custody pending this. 
However, the ambiguity as to whether forensic copies are subject to the Attorney-
General‟s direction may not be so important with countries like the United Kingdom 
trending towards sending material seized straight to the foreign authority instead of 
through the Central Authority. The concern rather should be focused on the material in 
these copies.  
 
 
 
93   Search and Surveillance Powers, above n 39, at [12.51]. 
94   At [12.13]. 
95   Search and Surveillance Act 2012, ss 110(i) and 162.  
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Winkelmann J said that Dotcom did not point to any particular private digital material 
contained on the devices, and presumed that the concern was over personal photographs 
and film.
96
 The procedures in place for when legally privileged material may be copied 
could be used for irrelevant material. S 147 of the Search and Surveillance Act allows that 
any person who wishes to claim privilege must provide a particularised list of things in 
respect of which the privilege is claimed, if that is not possible they can apply to a judge 
for direction. Domestic authorities would then have to put in measures to exclude this 
material. Privilege guarantees the right of an individual to independent legal advice. It is 
an important guarantee of the rule of law, and therefore considerations to completely 
exclude other irrelevant material from a forensic copy are not as important as protecting 
privilege. However, this process can be useful for determining what and whether irrelevant 
material is to be deleted, with the judge weighing the individual‟s rights against the 
importance of evidential integrity, and the prevention and detection of crime.  
 
1   Provision of copies 
 
Dotcom ordered that the individual must be provided with an entire copy of the hard 
drive before a “disclosable” copy (one where irrelevant material is deleted) is sent 
overseas. There is no statutory authority for this approach as it was a discretionary relief 
outcome in a judicial review proceeding. This can be a useful condition to impose if 
electronic material will be seized in the search warrant and police retain the hard drive for 
the duration of the request. Conditions can be effective in incorporating a common-sense, 
creative problem-solving approach to search warrants. These provisions should be utilised 
more for New Zealand to be responsive to MACMA requests.  
 
VI   Conclusion 
 
Dotcom v Attorney-General provides a platform for discussion on implementing a 
MACMA request. The statutory provisions are deliberately flexible to enable authorities to 
ensure that a request can be carried out in accordance with domestic law whilst also 
enabling its purpose to operate. The Attorney-General plays a central role in accepting and 
 
 
96   Second Dotcom judgment, above n 37, at [59]. 
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carrying out a request. The Attorney-General ensures that the request contains only lawful 
steps and where it goes outside this, cooperation with the requesting country should cut 
back this step. This article concluded that the mandatory refusal provision in s 27(1)(h) of 
MACMA should only be utilised if the request cannot be read down to accord with 
domestic law.  
 
The form and content of search warrants, and procedures for seized items has been 
superseded by the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, enacted after Dotcom. This leaves 
the enduring problem that this domestic legislation does not contemplate foreign 
investigation and proceedings. The areas where the interaction between the two statutes 
leaves uncertainties are in the direction for seized items particularly forensic copies, and 
whether irrelevant material must be deleted from them. S 49 of MACMA can be given a 
broad interpretation to include forensic copies, as this provision is intended to ensure that 
all items relevant to the criminal matter be under the Attorney-General’s direction. The 
courts have upheld the tradition to delete irrelevant material on forensic copies where 
possible, and this should be considered a condition to impose on the warrant if legislative 
amendment does not occur. Cooperation must also overcome uncertainties relating to 
determining the level of specificity in the warrant application and relevance of material to 
the offence. These can be propounded by the lack of operational knowledge for domestic 
authorities.  
 
New Zealand can provide the widest measure of cooperation available using the 
provisions in MACMA, but this power should also protect the rights of the individual. 
MACMA is sufficiently flexible to deal with changing circumstances and can fill in the 
gaps where the application of domestic legislation is uncertain. The imposition of search 
warrant conditions can respond to the number of exigencies that a request entails and will 
be useful for the requested country to ensure a lawful execution. The conditions that can be 
imposed include using joint investigative teams to help ascertain relevance; creating 
procedures for the offsite sorting process; and providing guidelines for managing mixed 
content devices by weighing the rights of the individual against the interests of preventing 
and detecting crime.  
 
Ultimately, search warrant requests will be unique to the particular offence and details. 
The role of the requested country is to be alert to the number of possibilities and 
31 
 
implications for the warrant execution, and use the flexibility of MACMA provisions to 
enable this execution in accordance with domestic law. The success of MACMA in 
addressing transnational crimes lies in the effectiveness of cooperation between authorities 
to ensure that circumstantial factors are translated into the warrant application and 
execution.  
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